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ABSTRACT: 
This paper studies polydrug use patterns in heroin and cocaine addicts. We use data on two 
experiments to measure the elasticity of several addictive drugs with respect to heroin and cocaine 
prices. Own and cross price elasticities are estimated while controlling for non-price related sources 
of variance. The results indicate that heroin addicts have an inelastic demand for heroin, 
complement heroin consumption with cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol and substitute Valium and 
cigarettes. Additionally, heroin addicts’ cocaine consumption is inelastic, and they substitute 
cocaine with marijuana and Valium, and complement it with alcohol. Cocaine addicts have an 
elastic demand for cocaine; they complement cocaine with heroin and alcohol and substitute it with 
marijuana and Valium. Cocaine addicts’ demand for heroin is inelastic; and, for this group, alcohol 
is a complement to heroin while cocaine, marijuana and Valium are substitutes to heroin. 
 
1
 Department of Economics, City University London, UK. 
2
 Department of Psychiatry University of Connecticut Health Center, Farmington, CT, 06030-3944, USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
   Illicit drug users consume a variety of drugs, with estimates indicating that 50% of heroin 
addicts use alcohol, 33% benzodiazepines, 47% cocaine, and 69% marijuana (Ball and Ross, 1991).  
Prevalence of marijuana and alcohol abuse in cocaine addicts ranges from 25 to 70% (Higgins et 
al., 1991; Schmitz et al., 1991), and between 60 and 90% of substance abusers smoke (Budney et 
al., 1993; Stark and Campbell, 1993). Polydrug abuse presents problems for treatment and public 
health initiatives.  Most drug-related emergency room visits involve combinations of alcohol and 
multiple illicit drugs (NIDA, 1991).  Polydrug abuse increases the likelihood of overdose (Risser 
and Schneider, 1994), participation in HIV risk behavior (Petry, 1999), and poor compliance with 
treatment (Ball and Ross, 1991).  Thus, the question of how drug users complement and substitute 
their main addictions as prices change is important and relevant for policy design.  
Despite the prevalence and problems of polydrug use, relatively little economic literature 
has focused on how prices influence polydrug use patterns specifically in addicted populations. We 
use Deaton and Muellbauer’s (1980a) Almost Ideal Demand System to examine substitution 
patterns. Given a budget and a set of street prices, substance abusers change drug purchases as 
heroin and cocaine prices vary. Implicitly, we assume that preferences are separable for addictive 
and all other goods.1 We estimate two specifications. First, we impose the no-free lunch condition 
that ensures individuals cannot spend more than they have. Second, we impose two micro-
economic consumer theory constraints on the coefficients known as homogeneity  (a proportionate 
change in income and prices will leave consumption of any one good unchanged) and symmetry  
(cross-price responses of any pair of goods are equal when price changes are compensated by 
equivalent income changes such that real income and utility remains intact). 
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 This assumption has been used extensively in demand estimation in other fields. And, although for simplicity we 
interpret the budgeting procedure as a two-stage procedure, the functional demand form we use (Almost Ideal Demand 
System) ensures the satisfaction of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the budgeting procedure to be consistent 
with a one-stage procedure. I.e., the group indirect utility functions have a generalized Gorman polar form and the 
overall utility function is additive, see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b).  
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We compare our experimental results to those obtained from real world situations.  Because 
our estimates lie comfortably within the ranges of previously estimated elasticities, we argue that 
our methodology may be a valid mechanism to elicit preferences from special populations. 
Moreover, characteristics of our sample are similar to characteristics of general addict populations. 
We find that heroin addicts have an inelastic demand for heroin. Heroin addicts also 
complement heroin consumption with cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol, but they substitute it with 
Valium and cigarettes.  Heroin addicts’ cocaine consumption is also inelastic; they substitute 
cocaine with marijuana and Valium, and they complement it with alcohol. In contrast, cocaine 
addicts have an elastic demand for cocaine; they complement cocaine with heroin and alcohol and 
substitute it with marijuana and Valium. Cocaine addicts’ demand for heroin is inelastic, and 
alcohol is a complement to heroin while cocaine, marijuana and Valium are substitutes to heroin. 
This paper contributes to prior literature in several ways. First, our experiments elicit drug 
addicts’ preferences for drugs in settings that are difficult to study naturalistically. Second, we 
calculate elasticities controlling for age, gender and race. Third, we apply an econometric 
methodology that estimates a demand functional form in accordance with consumer theory. Fourth, 
our data has policy implications specifically related to polydrug use patterns.  
2.  Related Literature 
Economic studies analyzing elasticities of licit and illicit drugs address two questions. They 
first examine the Becker-Murphy (1988) theory of rational addiction. If future variables have 
significant impact on current consumption, the theory of rational addiction cannot be rejected; such 
findings would be consistent with addicts anticipating future prices and adjusting use accordingly.  
The second question is what would happen if cocaine, marijuana, or heroin were legalized. To 
address this question, own price elasticities are estimated. To infer what would happen to other 
drug use if one is legalized, the signs of cross price elasticities are computed.  
An advantage of focusing on drug dependent individuals is that findings obtained from 
general populations may not be representative of addicted populations. Drug-dependent individuals 
may demonstrate different patterns of drug use and different demand for drugs than recreational or 
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infrequent users who are included in most economic studies.  Economic variables may also 
differentially influence polydrug use patterns in these populations.  Cocaine-dependent individuals, 
for example, may demonstrate different patterns of substitution than heroin-dependent individuals.  
To obtain elasticities of interest, we choose the Almost Ideal Demand System proposed by 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a). While most alternative methods contradict basic principles of 
microeconomic demand theory, the Almost Ideal Demand System satisfies underlying assumptions 
of consumer behavior. To our knowledge, only Jones (1989) has applied this approach to the study 
of addiction. He estimates alternative models of demand for cigarettes and alcohol using budget 
share equations and concludes that addiction plays an important factor in smoking. 
In the economic literature of addiction in general, the range of own price elasticities is 
surprisingly large and varies by drug, time frames over which prices change (short- vs. long-term), 
and population. Saffer and Chaloupka (1999a) estimate price elasticities of alcohol, cocaine and 
heroin to be –0.30, -0.28 and –0.94, respectively, using 1988, 1990 and 1991 National Household 
Surveys on Drug Abuse. Saffer and Chaloupka (1995) report price elasticities of -1.80 to -1.60 for 
heroin, and -1.10 to -0.72 for cocaine in another national sample of persons of all ages.  Grossman 
and Chaloupka (1998) report the long-run price elasticity2 of total consumption is -1.35 for youth.  
Using percentage of arrestees testing positive for cocaine and heroin and assumptions about 
the relationship between drug use and the probability of arrest, Caulkins (1996) estimates price 
elasticities of demand of -2.50 for cocaine and -1.50 for heroin.  In contrast, DiNardo (1993) finds 
that cocaine demand is irresponsive to price changes.  Silverman and Spruill (1977) and van Ours 
(1995) report demand for heroin in Detroit and the short run demand of opium in Indonesia, 
respectively, to be inelastic. Liu et al. (1999) finds that the short and long price elasticities of opium 
in Taiwan between 1914 and 1942 were -0.48 and -1.38, respectively.  Presumably, the long-term 
elasticities are more elastic because they assess effects of opium price among a wider range of 
individuals, including those who have not sampled the drug. As noted earlier, dependent and non-
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 The long run elasticity takes into account both the long run effect on quantities consumed by current users due and the 
effect that price changes have on participation decisions of potential users. 
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dependent individuals may show different elasticities. Bretteville-Jensen and Sutton (1999) find 
price responsiveness of heroin to be -1.23 for non-dealing users and -0.20 for dealers who use.  
Although fewer economic studies have examined cross price elasticities, Chaloupka, 
Grossman and Tauras’ (1999) find that cocaine and marijuana are either complements or 
independents. Saffer and Chaloupka (1999b) note evidence of complementarity between heroin, 
cocaine, marijuana and alcohol, but marijuana substituted for alcohol. Studies in general 
populations tend to show complementarity between alcohol and illicit drugs (Saffer and Chaloupka 
1999a, 1999b). Pacula (2001) finds that alcohol prices affect negatively marijuana demand 
(complementarity), but that cigarettes prices do not. Farrelly et al. (1999) maintains that marijuana, 
alcohol and tobacco are complements, and Dee (1999) shows a robust complementarity between 
alcohol and smoking. Pacula (1998a and 1998b) likewise finds alcohol and marijuana are 
complements. Decker et al. (2000) find that higher alcohol prices decrease smoking participation, 
but higher cigarette prices increase drinking.  However, none of these studies have evaluated the 
cross-price elasticities exclusively in heavy using or dependent populations.  
Thus, studies in general populations agree on the negative sign of own price elasticities and 
some cross price elasticities, but they differ in the range of the estimates.  The range is so large that 
the question arises as to the cause of such diversity: source of information, specification of the 
model, or the empirical methods. As Hunt et al. (1994) suggests, the lack of attention to the relation 
between theory and estimation makes discerning the cause of the diversity difficult. 
Attempts to understand the economic relationships between drugs have also been made by 
psychologists, primarily using laboratory paradigms. In these studies, drug-experienced subjects 
press levers to obtain access to drugs as the number of lever presses is altered as a proxy of price.  
In terms of own-price elasticities, demand for alcohol is more inelastic than demand for sucrose in 
rats with extensive alcohol histories (Petry and Heyman, 1995), and laboratory studies with human 
smokers find similar elasticities for nicotine as reported in the economic literature (e.g., Bickel et 
al., 1991).  With respect to cross-price elasticities, Bickel et al. (1995) review 16 studies in which 
two reinforcers, one or both of which were drugs, were concurrently available and prices varied 
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systematically.  Some drugs are substitutes for others (alcohol was a substitute for PCP; Carroll, 
1987), some serve as complements (cigarettes are a complement to heroin; Mello et al., 1980), and 
others are independent (cigarette use is independent of alcohol prices; Mello, 1987).  
Although relationships between drug prices and consumption could be studied in the 
laboratory by providing drugs to participants, logistical and ethical considerations exist. 
Hypothetical behavioral experiments involve simulation of essential aspects of a situation to elicit 
the behavior in question (Epstein, 1986).  The methods are used in experimental economics such 
that resultant data are predictive of real-world behavior (Plott, 1986).  Recently, a paradigm was 
developed to apply economic analyses to the phenomenon of polydrug abuse.  Drug abusers are 
given imitation money, and prices of drugs are indicated on paper.  Subjects state the types and 
quantities of drugs they would buy, presuming they had the available incomes. Changes in drug 
choices are examined as a function of prices. A study with heroin addicts (Petry & Bickel, 1998a) 
finds that cocaine is a complement to heroin.  In addition, Valium is a substitute for heroin, but this 
relationship is not symmetrical; price of Valium has no effect on purchases of heroin in heroin 
addicts.  A second study with alcoholics (Petry, 2001a) finds that cocaine is a complement to 
alcohol, but alcohol is a substitute for cocaine.  Demand for all other drugs is independent of both 
alcohol and cocaine prices.  These studies evaluated how changes in drug purchases affected 
consumption patterns, without controlling for social demographic variables.  
The purpose of this study is to replicate and methodologically improve the above findings 
by integrating the psychological (laboratory paradigm based) and economic (econometric based) 
approaches.  We examine effects of heroin and cocaine prices on preferences for heroin, cocaine, 
alcohol, marijuana, Valium and cigarettes.  Both heroin and cocaine addicts are tested to assess 
whether the relationships between drug prices and consumption varies between the two groups.   
3. Data and design 
Here, we describe our data, experimental design, recruitment strategy, and summary of characteristics. 
3.1 Data 
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Our data were collected from two experiments run simultaneously. A total of 81 subjects 
participated, and they were recruited using newspaper advertisements and flyers at low-income 
housing projects and social service agencies in the Hartford, CT, area.  A telephone screen assessed 
eligibility criteria, which included Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) criteria for heroin or cocaine dependence, age 18 or older, and English 
speaking. Subjects were categorized into their “hardest” drug of abuse, with heroin considered a 
harder drug than cocaine. Thus, subjects meeting criteria for heroin dependence were classified as 
“heroin addicts,” even if they were dependent on other drugs, including cocaine. “Cocaine addicts” 
included subjects meeting cocaine dependence criteria with or without other dependencies, with the 
exception of heroin.  A structured interview assessed lifetime abuse histories. Subjects also 
provided a breath sample that was screened for alcohol and a urine specimen that was screened for 
recent use of opiates, cocaine, and marijuana3. Subjects provided written informed consent and 
received $50 for participation.  Those not in substance abuse treatment were referred for treatment.  
TABLE 1 
Table 1 shows demographic and drug use characteristics for the two groups. Gender, racial, 
and martial status are similar, but income was lower in heroin addicts than in cocaine addicts. Drug 
use histories were similar between groups except that heroin addicts use more heroin and 
benzodiazepines than cocaine addicts.  Heroin addicts also had more legal problems. 
Social demographic characteristics of our sample are very similar to larger sample addict 
populations. From a nationally representative sample of 1,799 addicts in treatment between 1988 
and 1990, SROS-SAMHSA (1998) reports that 71.4% were male, 60.1% white, 28.4% black, 8.2% 
Hispanic, with a range of years of age, education, and marital and legal status similar to our sample.  
Design 
This subsection describes the design of the experiments, in which various drugs, in amounts 
typically used for a “hit” were presented on a piece of paper.  Initial prices for each drug were 
representative of Hartford, CT, street prices as determined by informal survey. In Experiment 1, 
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price of heroin varied from $3, $6, $15 and $30 per bag, while all other drugs remained at their 
street prices.  In Experiment 2, price of cocaine varied from $2, $4, $10 and $20 per eighth gram. 
Drug Quantity Street Price Price Variations 
Heroin 1 bag $15  $3, $6, $15 and $30 
Cocaine 81 gram $10  $2, $4, $10 and $20 
Marijuana 1 joint $5   
Alcohol 1 drink $1   
Valium 1 pill $1   
Cigarettes 1 pack $2   
The experimenter read instructions (Appendix 1) and handed subjects $35 of imitation 
money. The two experiments were conducted concurrently, and the order of conditions was 
randomized for each subject.  Subjects had to allocate their budgets to purchase their ideal 
consumption basket, given the prices faced. They were presented 8 different price situations 
generating a total of 648 observations. Since some participants did not choose to spend the entire 
budget for drugs, we assume that undesired purchases were not made. Nevertheless, participants 
could not carry over any amount towards purchases in the next experiment.  
TABLE 2 
Table 2 reports participants’ drug choices when faced with different heroin and cocaine 
price combinations. Tables on the left panel describe heroin choices by heroin addicts, and tables 
on the right panel heroin choices by cocaine addicts. The first two columns of the tables in Table 2 
contain heroin and cocaine price combinations presented to participants. For each combination, we 
report the frequency with which participants bought each number of drug units, i.e., two heroin 
addicted participants did not buy any heroin at all when the price of a bag of heroin was $3 and 1/8 
gram of cocaine was $10, while 3 participants decided to buy 11 bags of heroin. Tables 2.3-2.4, 
2.5-2.6, 2.7-2.8, 2.9-2.10, and 2.11-2.12 report choices for cocaine, marijuana, alcohol, Valium and 
cigarettes, respectively. The bottom row of each table reports total amounts of units purchased, and 
the last cell shows the grand total of units purchased at any price. From looking at the grand totals 
of Table 2, we observe that heroin addicts consume more than ten times the quantity of heroin than 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
EZScreen (Editek, Inc., Burlington, NC). 
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cocaine addicts do (723 as opposed to 65); cocaine addicts consume about five times more cocaine 
than heroin addicts (1138 as opposed to 213); heroin addicts consume more marijuana joints (111 
as opposed to 72); less alcohol (931 as opposed to 1575); twice the amount of Valium (103 as 
opposed to 43); and fewer packages of cigarettes (654 as opposed to 954). 
As an indicator of the quality of our experimental data, we calculate Spearman correlations4 
between experimental choices and years of regular use of each drug as shown in table 3.  
TABLE 3 
The number of units of each drug purchased in the simulation is significantly correlated 
with years of lifetime regular use for each drug.  Table 3 also presents point biserial correlations5 of 
experimental choices and objective indicators of recent use of heroin and marijuana, as assessed by 
urinalysis. These correlations are positive and significant for heroin and marijuana, significant at 
the 92% level for alcohol, and not significant for cocaine. In sum, Table 3 shows that choices made 
in the experiment are consistent with real life drug use. Therefore, we assume that this is a valid 
sample of drug addicts to infer illegal drug own and cross price elasticities. In the next section, we 
describe the econometric specification we use to measure these elasticities.  
4. Econometric Specification 
First, we provide the demand system specification used to estimate own and cross price 
elasticities. Next, we explain how demand system coefficients estimate the elasticities of interest. 
The demand of a good equals the aggregate demand of all individuals who constitute the 
market for that good. Each individual’s demand is derived from the decision process of maximizing 
utility subject to a budget constraint. Assuming an arbitrary aggregate demand function is not 
innocuous, a particular functional form may impose restrictions on the underlying consumer utility 
and expenditure functions. Log-linear and linear specifications of the demand for a good are often 
chosen for their simplicity but may violate the principle that consumers cannot spend more than 
they have (see Hunt et al. (1994) and Stern (1986) for a detailed discussion of these specifications).  
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 Because of the non-normality of both drug choices and years of use, their correlation is assessed using Spearman 
correlations. 
5
 The correlations between positive objective drug use (from urinalysis and breathalyzer readings) and the choices of 
drugs are calculated using point biserial correlations because the objective drug use measure is dichotomous.  
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We estimate cross price elasticities of drugs using the demand functional form proposed by 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) known as the Almost Ideal Demand System. This system gives an 
arbitrary first-order approximation to any demand system that is consistent with the notion of 
scarcity (by which individuals are forced to make choices) and satisfies the axioms of individual 
choice.  Besides applying a new methodology for the estimation of price elasticity, our 
specification also controls for age, gender, education, health and employment status. 
Deaton and Muellbauer propose this equation for budget share of the i-th good of household l:6 
where pi is the price of good i; Cl/P l is the total real expenditure on all (n) goods in the consumer's 
budget; P l is a price index; Zil is a set of exogeneous variables describing the individual -or 
household- l characteristics; and il is individual l’s idiosyncratic taste for drug i. 
For a demand system to be in accordance to the properties of demand functions known as 
adding up, homogeneity and symmetry, the estimated parameters must satisfy these restrictions:  
Adding up: iiiijiiii  i,j (2) 
Homogeneity: nj= 1ij= 0 i    (3) 
Symmetry: ij=ji  i,j    (4) 
The restriction of adding-up ensures that the parameters estimated are compatible with the 
fact that the sum of purchases on all goods has to be equal to their budget (iwi= 1). The restriction 
of homogeneity guarantees that the underlying demand is homogeneous of degree zero in prices and 
total expenditure taken together (i.e., if prices and income are multiplied by the same positive 
number, the quantities purchased are unaffected). Finally, equation 4 guarantees the Slutsky 
symmetry condition, e.g., cross-price responses of any pair of goods are equal when price changes 
are compensated by equivalent income changes so that the real income (and utility) remains intact.  
We assume that the utility of drugs is weakly separable from the quantities consumed for all 
other goods.7 This is consistent with the study design where the budget given to the participants 
                                                          
6
 The budget share is the fraction of the individuals total expenditure that is spent on good i: wi= (piqi/ y), where qi is the 
quantity of good i purchased, pi its price, and y the individual's total expenditure. 
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was to be spent on drugs, assuming that the fraction of income assigned to all other goods is 
decided in another decision stage. We consider the second stage of a two stage budgeting process 
when consumers decide how much of the drug budget they allocate among different drugs, given 
their relative prices. Adapting the Almost Ideal Demand System in equation (1) to our setting, the 
budget share of heroin, cocaine, marijuana, alcohol, Valium, and cigarettes are given by: 
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where subscripts h,c,m,a,v,c stand for heroin, cocaine, marijuana, alcohol, Valium, and cigarettes; 
subscript l stands for the lth individual, and superscript t stands for the tth price setting, and the rest 
of variables are defined as for equation (1). For simplicity, from now on we suppress the t 
superscript. Given the nature of our experiment, instead of using total real income, Cl/P l, as 
described in (1), we have to use total expenditure on drugs, i.e., Cl=  qlhPh+ qlcPc+ qlmPm+ qlaPa+  
+ qlvPv+ qltP t. The logarithm of the index of prices P l is obtained using the Stone linear 
approximation, i.e. by weighting the logarithm of each price by the mean share of each drug in 
individual's l budget: lnP l= wlhlnPh+ wlclnPc+  wlmlnPm+ wlalnPa+ wlvlnPv+ wltlnP t.. The social 
demographic variables included in Zl are: gender, being white or not, years of age, years of 
education, an indicator of employment problems and an indicator of medical problems.8 
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 Nevertheless, and as mentioned earlier, using the Almost Ideal Demand System ensures that our addictive substances 
demand system is consistent with a one stage procedure, see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b). 
8
 The employment and medical problems indicators are based on answers to employment and health related questions, 
for more details about their construction see McLellan (1988). Although the weighting system used to obtain them is 
arguable, these severity indices are positively correlated with employment and medical problems and we use them as 
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Once parameters in equations (5-10) are estimated, own and cross price elasticities are 
calculated: 
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Following Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a), first, we estimate the demand system, equations 
(5) to (10), without restrictions (3) and (4). By construction, the unconstrained estimated 
coefficients do satisfy the adding-up constraints since the expenditure shares in drugs sum up to 1. 
Second, we test if the unconstrained coefficients satisfy the homogeneity constraint, equation (3), 
and the symmetry constraint, equation (4).9 Additionally, we estimate equations (5) to (10) subject 
to the homogeneity and symmetry constraints, i.e., subject to equations (3) and (4). We call these 
estimates constrained. Elasticities in (11) and (12) are then calculated using the estimated 
parameters and individual sample budget share means.10  
The next section reports the results of the estimation, and the limitations of the estimates. 
5. Results 
In this section, we present the estimates for equations (5) to (10). The system of equations is 
estimated by using generalized least squares to account for the error correlation structure across 
equations. We use White-corrected standard errors, which control for the fact that we have repeated 
observations on individuals. In the next part, we report on own and cross price elasticities.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                
proxies for real employment and health problems. Although medical and employment problems are potentially 
endogenous variables in the system, specifications where they were not included did not alter significantly the results. 
Therefore, we report the specification that includes these two variables. 
9
 Although due to the nature and design of the experiment there might exist data censoring issues, we choose not to 
correct for those as have done other published applications using the Almost Ideal System. 
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 Assuming that the mean budget shares are independent across individuals, the variances of the own-price and cross-
price elasticities have been obtained by using the formulae: 
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where iil and ijl indicate individual l own-price elasticity for good i and cross-price elasticity for good i with respect to 
changes in prices of good j; budget share wlk indicates individual l’s sample mean budget share for good k, and 
coefficients  and  correspond to the estimates obtained by taking equations (2) and (3) to the data. 
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The estimates for the demand system of heroin addicts are reported in table 4, and those of 
cocaine addicts in table 5. Tables 4 and 5 report three sets of coefficients for each drug: The first 
column contains what we call unconstrained coefficients, i.e., estimated without imposing the 
symmetry and the homogeneity restrictions, although it should be noted that the adding up 
restriction is satisfied by construction. The second column contains the constrained coefficients 
obtained by simultaneously estimating heroin, cocaine, marijuana, alcohol and Valium demand 
equations subject to the homogeneity and the symmetry constraints. The cigarette demand equation 
is not included because, due to the adding-up restriction, the covariance matrix is singular and the 
likelihood function undefined, i.e., one of the demand equations is redundant and the elasticities 
can be calculated without estimating it.  At the end of tables 4 and 5, we report the R squared. The 
p-value at the bottom compares the estimated model a model in which all coefficients are restricted 
to be zero. This test is distributed as a F(k-1,n) , where k is the number of regressors included, l the 
number of restrictions when applicable, and n the number of observations.   
The homogeneity and the symmetry tests on the unconstrained model coefficients test if 
these estimates satisfy equations (3) and (4), respectively.  To test the homogeneity constraint we 
test whether the sum of the coefficients of the log of the prices of heroin and cocaine sum up to 
zero for each equation. Each of statistics tests follows a c2 probability distribution with 1 degree of 
freedom. To test the symmetry constraint we have to test whether the sum of the coefficients 
corresponding to the log of the price of cocaine in the heroin equation and the coefficient of the log 
of the price of heroin in the cocaine equation is zero, and reciprocally, that the sum of the heroin 
equation’s coefficient for the log of the price of cocaine and the coefficient for the log of the price 
of heroin in the cocaine equation is zero. Each of these statistics follows a c2 probability 
distribution with 1 degree of freedom.  
In the next few paragraphs we discuss the effects of the demographic characteristics on the 
demand of the various drugs, as reported in Tables 4 and 5. Since heroin and cocaine price 
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coefficients in equations (5) to (10) cannot be interpreted as price elasticities, we analyze heroin 
and cocaine price effects on each drug demand using the elasticity estimates reported in Table 6. 
Social Demographic Characteristics: 
The effect of years of age, education, race, employment and health problems on the demand 
of the different drugs can be analyzed looking at the coefficients reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
Looking at the constrained model, we observe that, for heroin addicts, the effect of age is not 
significant for any drug. Being male increases the use of alcohol. Whites buy relatively more 
alcohol than non-whites. Years of education influence positively the purchases of heroin and 
Valium. Heroin addicts with more employment problems tend to use more heroin but less cocaine 
and alcohol. More health problems are associated with lower cocaine purchases. In the constrained 
specification for cocaine addicts, years of age and being white affect positively the use of valium. 
Health problems are associated with higher heroin consumption. 
In the unconstrained model, and for heroin addicts, being male positively affects use of 
alcohol and negatively that of Valium. Being white affects positively the consumption of alcohol. 
Years of education have a positive effect on heroin and Valium purchases. Employment problems 
are associated positively to heroin consumption, and negatively to that of cocaine and alcohol. 
Finally, health problems are associated with less cocaine. For cocaine addicts, age and being white 
affect positively purchases of Valium, and health problems relate to heroin use.  
With respect to the variable real expenditure, we observe that, for heroin addicts, its sign is 
significant and negative in both specifications of the heroin demand, and positive and significant 
for both specifications for the demand of alcohol. Thus, for heroin addicts, an increase in the 
individual purchasing power due to changes in prices decreases heroin’s budget share and increases 
that of alcohol, which means that heroin is an inferior  good where, for these individuals, alcohol 
could be considered a luxury good. The inferiority of illegal drugs has been documented in the 
literature. Roy (2005) provides a good summary of the existing evidence. 
For cocaine addicts, real expenditure has a negative coefficient for both specifications of 
demand of heroin and marijuana, a negative coefficient for the unconstrained specification for 
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cocaine, and a positive coefficient for both specifications of the demand for alcohol. Thus, for 
cocaine addicts, heroin, cocaine and marijuana are inferior goods and alcohol a luxury good. 
Homogeneity test: Taking a look at the homogeneity test on the coefficients of the 
unconstrained model specification in Tables 4 and 5, we observe that all but the cocaine and 
marijuana equations do not reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity for heroin addicts. For 
cocaine addicts, all equations but that of Valium do not reject the homogeneity null hypothesis.  
Symmetry test: The symmetry test on the null hypothesis described in equation (4) is not 
rejected for both the heroin addicts and the cocaine addicts. The fact that both tests are rejected so 
infrequently may partially explain why some coefficients are so similar in both specifications. Also, 
note that even if for a particular drug the unconstrained coefficients do not satisfy the homogeneity 
and symmetry conditions, they always satisfy the adding-up restriction. Therefore, the generating 
demand satisfies that there is no free lunch. Even if not optimal, the elasticities obtained using these 
coefficients present advantages with respect to previously obtained values.  
Next, we discuss effects of heroin and cocaine price changes on demand of all drugs in 
terms of own and cross price elasticities. These elasticities are calculated using equations (11) and 
(12) and the estimates of the demand system in equations (5) to (10). Table 6 summarizes the own 
and cross price elasticities of heroin, cocaine, marijuana, alcohol, Valium and cigarettes with 
respect to changes in heroin and cocaine prices, for heroin addicts and cocaine addicts separately.  
TABLE 6 
We complement the explanation of effects of heroin and cocaine prices on the demand of 
the different drugs as reported in Table 6 with figures. These figures plot the average purchases of 
drugs as a function of heroin and cocaine prices. Note that figures are based on unconditional 
average purchases while elasticities in Table 6 are obtained controlling by age, education, etc. 
Experiment 1: Heroin price changes 
Figure 1 shows heroin average purchases as a function of its price in Experiment 1. Data 
from heroin addicts are shown in open symbols and data from cocaine addicts in filled symbols.  As 
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expected, on average heroin addicts purchase greater quantities of heroin than cocaine addicts, and 
in both groups the number of average purchases decreases as price of heroin increases.  
FIGURE 1 
Heroin own price elasticity: In table 6, we observe that the unconstrained model heroin 
own-price elasticity for both samples is similar and between -0.917 (heroin addicts) and -0.913 
(cocaine addicts), being lower when the homogeneity and symmetry conditions are imposed (-
0.818 heroin addicts, -0.882 cocaine addicts).   
TABLE 6 
Heroin cross price elasticities: The effects of heroin price changes on all other drug 
purchases except for heroin are shown in Figure 2. The effects of heroin price changes in heroin 
addicts’ average purchases appear in the top panel of the figure, and the effects in cocaine addicts’ 
average purchases appear in the bottom panel.  
FIGURE 2 
In table 6 we see that among heroin addicts, the price of heroin influences the purchases of 
cocaine, marijuana, Valium, alcohol and cigarettes. Looking at the unconstrained coefficients, we 
observe that for heroin addicts cocaine (-0.182), marijuana (-0.055) and alcohol (-0.289) are 
complements where Valium (0.067) and cigarettes (0.242) are substitutes. The constrained 
specification leads to similar results although for that specification alcohol is a stronger 
complement (-0.792) and Valium becomes a complement (-0.034).  
For cocaine addicts, according to the unconstrained model, cocaine (0.189), marijuana 
(0.100), and Valium (0.015) are substitutes for heroin, and alcohol (-1.586) is a complement. The 
constrained specification leads similar qualitative results. 
Experiment 2: Cocaine prices changes 
Figure 3 shows cocaine average purchases as a function of its price in Experiment 2. 
FIGURE 3 
Cocaine own price elasticity: Table 6 shows price of cocaine significantly affects cocaine 
purchases in both heroin and cocaine addicts. Demand for cocaine is inelastic in heroin addicts with 
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estimates close to -0.9 (-0.902 unconstrained, -0.892 constrained). For cocaine addicts, demand for 
cocaine has a negative slope in both specifications but it is elastic (-1.051) in the unconstrained 
specification and -0.896 in the constrained one. 
Cocaine cross price elasticities: Figure 4 shows purchases of other drugs as a function of 
cocaine prices.  In heroin addicts (top panel), according to both the unconstrained and constrained 
model, marijuana (0.091 and 0.224) and Valium (0.090 and 0.043, respectively) are substitutes for 
cocaine, while alcohol (-0.384 and -0.635), and cigarettes only in constrained specification, -0.274 
are a complement.  
In cocaine addicts, heroin is a complement to cocaine according to the unconstrained 
specification (-0.051) and a substitute in the constrained one (0.057), alcohol is a complement to 
cocaine according to both models (-0.057 and -0.941), while marijuana (0.052 and 0.090) and 
Valium (0.006 and 0.011) are substitutes. 
FIGURE 4 
Limitations: 
Results from this study must be interpreted in light of several additional limitations.  First of 
all, choices in this procedure are hypothetical, and they may not be consistent with real-world drug 
use patterns.  Whether substance abusers actually would choose these same types and amounts of 
drugs in natural settings is not known.  Drug preferences were evaluated over large changes in price 
conditions that may or may not be analogous to how drug prices change on the streets.  Two- to 
three-fold increases in prices were used to evaluate preferences under extreme conditions. 
Similarly, prices for illicit drugs also can vary markedly from day to day in real-world settings 
(e.g., when a large shipment comes in compared to after a police raid).  Nevertheless, whether 
smaller changes in price engender similar effects could be a topic worth studying. 
This study evaluated only short-term effects with respect to own and cross-price elasticities.  
The present study imposed a one-day temporal frame on purchasing decisions because we, and 
others, have shown that substance abusers have a significantly truncated time horizon (Brettenville-
Jensen et al., 1999; Kirby et al., 1999; Petry and Casarrella, 1999; Vuchinich and Simpson, 1998).  
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Therefore, hypothetical decisions made over longer time intervals may be less valid.  The use of a 
constant temporal frame, however, may have the drawback of not reflecting the manner in which 
decisions are made in real-world situations. Nevertheless, as predicted by the rational addiction 
theory (Becker and Murphy, 1988), individuals’ long-run elasticities tend to be larger than short-
run elasticities. Secondly, long-run effects of price changes affect not only current users but also 
participation decisions of potential ones. Thus, the elasticities reported could safely be considered a 
lower-bound of the long-run elasticities, probably more relevant for policy making decisions. 
Other factors, including moods, social contexts, and fear of legal recourse, also may affect 
choices for drugs, but these variables were not evaluated in the present study.  Future research may 
address the influence of these and other factors and how they may interact with economic variables 
in influencing drug use (see also Glautier, 1998; Reuter, 1998).  
6. Policy Implications  
Taking the unconstrained model estimates as the relevant ones there are some relevant 
policy implications of our results. First, heroin addicts are big consumers of heroin, and they also 
use substantial amounts of cocaine (see table 2). For heroin addicts, cocaine is a complement to 
heroin, and increases in heroin prices reduce their heroin as well as their cocaine consumption. For 
cocaine addicts, heroin prices do affect both heroin negatively and cocaine positively as cocaine is 
a substitute to heroin for this group. Therefore, heroin price increases will reduce heroin and 
cocaine addicts’ heroin consumption; but, while heroin addicts’ cocaine consumption will be 
reduced, cocaine addicts’ cocaine consumption will be increased. An increase in the price of 
cocaine will, on the other hand, reduce heroin and cocaine addicts’ cocaine consumption and -very 
moderately- cocaine addicts’ heroin consumption. Taking all these considerations together it seems 
that it may be more efficient to pay special attention to cocaine-price increasing policies rather than 
to heroin-price increasing policies. The reason is that the former will reduce heroin and cocaine 
consumption by both types of addicts while the latter will have ambiguous effects by increasing 
cocaine addicts’ cocaine consumption. 
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From a policy point of view, an important implication of the fact that cocaine and heroin are 
found to be inferior goods is that income redistributive policies may help alleviate the problem of 
substance abuse, as indicated by Roy (2005). 
Finally, our results indicate that policies that increase prices of heroin may create greater 
addiction to Valium and cigarettes for heroin addicts, and to cocaine, marijuana and Valium for 
cocaine addicts. Similarly, policies that increase the price of cocaine may induce greater addiction 
to marijuana and Valium for both types of addicts. To put in place compensatory policies to 
alleviate the spill-over addictive effects of increasing heroin and cocaine prices would seem 
advisable. 
7. Summary and conclusions  
Illicit drug users often abuse a wide variety of drugs.  Polydrug use presents an enigma to 
both medical treatment providers and economists trying to predict the consequences of drug 
policies. We utilize an experimental method to provide information to psychologists about how 
drug prices may influence polydrug use patterns controlling for other than price influential factors, 
and to economists about how price-affecting policies may affect addicts' drug use and their welfare. 
We study polydrug use patterns in heroin and cocaine addicts using two experiments that 
vary heroin and cocaine prices. We obtain own price elasticities of heroin and cocaine, and cross 
price elasticities of these and other drugs when heroin and cocaine prices vary.  We apply an 
econometric methodology that estimates a demand functional form in accordance with consumer 
theory. Additionally, this paper illustrates how a particular demand function specification may 
influence the value of the elasticities obtained. As an innovation with respect to the illicit drug 
elasticities obtained in experimental settings, we control for other sources of variation besides the 
change of prices by including demographic factors in our elasticities' estimation method.  
Traditionally, the psychological literature has not controlled for demographics in estimating 
elasticities.  Generally, both methods produce similar results, although the econometric analysis 
finds significant effects of drug prices on larger selections of drugs.   
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We find that heroin addicts show an inelastic demand for both heroin (-0.917) and cocaine 
(–0.902). Meanwhile, cocaine addicts’ seem more responsive to prices. For this group, cocaine 
demand is very much affected by cocaine price changes (-1.051), but their heroin demand is 
inelastic (-0.913). Heroin addicts seem to complement their heroin consumption with cocaine, 
marijuana and alcohol, but substitute it with Valium and cigarettes.  Heroin addicts substitute their 
cocaine consumption with marijuana and Valium and complement it with alcohol. Cocaine addicts 
behave slightly differently and substitute heroin intake with cocaine, marijuana and Valium, and 
complement it with alcohol.  Cocaine addicts complement cocaine consumption with heroin and 
alcohol and substitute it with marijuana and Valium. 
Taken together, these results suggest that heroin and cocaine addicts show differential 
demands for drugs depending on the prices of heroin and cocaine, and these effects are not always 
symmetrical.  Heroin is a complement to cocaine for heroin addicts but cocaine prices seem not to 
affect their heroin’s consumption. In contrast, cocaine addicts substitute cocaine for heroin when 
heroin prices increase but, at the same time complement their cocaine intake with heroin. Heroin 
addicts have a significantly inelastic demand for heroin and cocaine, while cocaine addicts have an 
elastic demand (-1.051) for cocaine and an inelastic demand for heroin. Valium is a substitute for 
heroin and cocaine for heroin addicts, but a much weaker substitute for heroin and cocaine in 
cocaine addicts. Nevertheless, alcohol seems to be a complement to heroin for both types of addicts 
but its consumption is much more affected by heroin prices for cocaine addicts. Finally, marijuana 
is a complement to heroin for heroin addicts and a substitute for cocaine addicts. 
Our results are validated from different perspectives:  First, drug choices in the simulation 
are correlated with lifetime drug abuse histories as well as objective indicators of recent drug use 
and three previous studies (Petry, 2000, 2001a; Petry and Bickel, 1998b).  Second, subjects are 
exposed to the same price conditions twice to assess reliability of choices.  Test-retest reliability 
correlations indicate good reliability between repeat exposures, ranging from 0.44 to 1.0 across 
studies (Petry, 2000, 2001a, 2001b; Petry and Bickel, 1998a). Third, our results are consistent with 
both economic and clinical findings.  Elasticities obtained from this paradigm lie comfortably in the 
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range of elasticities found in the literature.  As expected, heroin and cocaine addicts seem to have a 
more inelastic demand for both heroin and cocaine than general populations.  The finding that 
marijuana use decreases as heroin prices increases seems consistent with evidence in economic 
research (Saffer and Chaloupka, 1999b). Clinically, heroin addicts frequently use cocaine and 
heroin simultaneously, in a drug combination known as a “speedball.”  The complementary 
relationship between heroin and cocaine seems congruent with this use pattern in natural settings.  
Valium abates opioid withdrawal symptoms in treatment settings (Green and Jaffee, 1977; Woods 
et al., 1987), and the finding that Valium is a substitute for heroin is consistent with clinical data.  
Cocaine addicts, who by definition were not dependent upon heroin, purchase far less 
heroin than heroin addicts in this simulation procedure.  That alcohol is a complement to cocaine in 
cocaine addicts is also consistent with clinical and physiological data. Cocaine and alcohol interact 
to produce coca-ethalyene, a metabolite that has reinforcing effects of its own (McCance-Katz, et 
al., 1993) and reduces the crash associated with cessation of cocaine use (Gawin and Kleber, 1986). 
This work illustrates that controlled experiments may provide useful information about 
preferences for combinations of licit and illicit drugs in a difficult to study group. The use of this 
paradigm may aid in better understanding how drug users complement and substitute their main 
addiction(s) as drugs’ prices change. These data show how prices of heroin and cocaine influence 
drug use patterns differently in two distinct groups of drug addicts.  Just as the two drug dependent 
populations show distinct patterns, non-dependent samples are likely to demonstrate even more 
disparate drug use patterns in response to price changes.  Recreational users may show different 
patterns compared to individuals who have never sampled illicit drugs. That is precisely why our 
results are important. The more we know about how populations complement and substitute their 
addictions, the better we can design and calibrate drug policies and health care initiatives.  
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APPENDIX 1: 
 
STUDY INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
 
"These next questions are to find out your choices for drugs across changes in prices.  This 
information is entirely for research purposes. We're going to use this sheet and fake money to play a type of 
game.  Please answer the questions honestly and thoughtfully: 
 
 Assume you have access to $35 a day that you can buy drugs with (The experimenter handed the 
subject the imitation money).  
 
The drugs you may buy and their prices are listed on this sheet  (The experimenter pointed to the 
price sheet).  
 
You may buy any drugs you'd like with this money, and there are no consequences to using these 
drugs. So, assume this is a study that has been approved by the police and all other organizations.  
 
Also, assume that the only drugs you will receive are those you purchase with the allotted $35 per 
day. You have no other drugs available to you.  You cannot purchase more drugs, or any other drugs except 
those you choose below.  Therefore, assume you have no other drugs stashed away, you have no 
prescriptions for anything (including antabuse, naltrexone, methadone or Valium), and you cannot get drugs 
through any other source, other than those you buy with your $35 per day.   
 
Also, assume that the drugs you are about to purchase are for your consumption only.  In other 
words, you can’t sell them or give them to anyone else.   You also can’t save up any drugs you buy and use 
them another day. Everything you buy is, therefore, for your own personal consumption within a 24-hour 
period.  
 
With this $___, please indicate what you would purchase, and I’m going to check off each drug as 
you buy it so you’ll know what you’ve purchased."  
Heroin 
Addicts
Cocaine 
Addicts
Heroin 
Addicts
Cocaine 
Addicts
Observations 41 40 Observations 41 40
Male 63% 73% Lifetime Abuse or dependence
Race 0% 0% Heroin 100% 25%
Caucasian 42% 38% Cocaine 83% 100%
African American 32% 48% Alcohol 80% 80%
Hispanic 24% 12% Marijuana 76% 72%
Native American 2% 2% Benzodiazepines 29% 15%
Years Age 38 (7) 40 (7) Breath or urine sample positive
Years of education 12 (2) 13 (2) Opioids 50% 0%
$5155 
($5772)
$7034 
($9867) Cocaine 50% 48%
Marital Status Alcohol 3% 3%
Married 8% 17% Marijuana 30% 15%
Remarried 5% 2% History of intravenous drug u 78% 18%
Widowed 5% Legal Problems
Separated 8% 10% Awaiting Trial 23% 10%
Divorced 23% 12% Days of Illegal Activities 3.25 1.04
Never Married 53% 59% (8) (3.5)
Housing Illegal Money  $        244  $        32 
Homeless 43% 59%  ($915)  ($158) 
Days homeless 108 292
(219) (533)
Living in shelter 38% 54%
Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.
Table 1: Socio Demographic Characteristics
Annual Legal Income
heroin cocaine 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 19 20 27 29 31 33 heroin cocaine 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 20 25 30 33 35
3 10 24 1 1 5 1 3 3 1 1 1 3 10 16 1 3 9 1 2 1 3 2 1 1
6 10 25 1 6 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 6 10 14 2 2 6 2 4 1 4 2 1 1  1
15 10 22 3 7 2 3 1 1 1 1 15 10 15 2 1 7 3 3 1 4 1 1 1 1
30 10 23 3 6 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 30 10 14 2 1 6 3 4 1 5 1 1 1 1
15 2 26 2 2 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 15 2 13 6 5 2 5 1 2 1 2 1 1 1
15 4 26 1 2 4 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 15 4 13 5 1 5 4 4 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
15 10 22 3 7 2 3 1 1 1 1 15 10 15 2 1 7 3 3 1 4 1 1 1 1
15 20 23 1 5 5 3 1 1 1 1 15 20 11 2 1 4 5 1 4 1 1 3 2 2 1 1 1
Total: 4 32 132 52 105 12 64 9 10 22 24 78 28 0 16 85 19 20 27 29 31 132 931 Total: 22 20 ## 56 ## 30 35 48 280 11 120 65 28 45 120 125 30 33 210 1575
cocaine addicts
heroin cocaine 0 1 2 3 4 7 heroin cocaine 0 1 2 3 4
3 10 38 2 1 3 10 37 1 2
6 10 32 7 2 6 10 37 1 2
15 10 30 7 4 15 10 37 1 2
30 10 30 8 1 1 1 30 10 38 1 1
15 2 34 6 1 15 2 36 2 1 1
15 4 34 4 3 15 4 38 2
15 10 30 7 4 15 10 37 1 2
15 20 31 5 1 3 1 15 20 38 1 1
Total: 46 34 12 4 7 103 Total: 6 26 3 8 43
heroin cocaine 0 1 2 3 4 5 7 14 29 heroin cocaine 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 14 15 35
3 10 6 8 15 5 6 1 3 10 8 3 10 5 3 10
6 10 7 10 16 4 2 2 6 10 8 4 9 5 2 10 1
15 10 9 2 23 2 1 4 15 10 7 5 9 2 4 11 3
30 10 8 3 19 3 1 5 1 1 30 10 7 5 8 3 3 13
15 2 6 13 14 5 3 15 2 7 4 9 7 4 6 1 1 1
15 4 6 11 13 7 3 1 15 4 9 8 8 5 3 4 1 2
15 10 9 2 23 2 1 4 15 10 7 5 9 2 4 11 2
15 20 12 4 18 2 5 15 20 8 4 7 4 4 8 1 1 1 1
Total: 53 282 90 44 135 7 14 29 654 Total: 38 ## 99 ## ## 6 21 8 9 0 112 15 35 954
Table 2: Summary of the consumption patterns of alcohol, Valium and cigarettes at various prices
packs of cigarettes
heroin addicts
heroin addicts
valium pills prices ($)
prices ($)
number of alcohol drinksprices ($) number of alcohol drinks
heroin addicts
prices ($)Grand Total
prices ($)
prices ($)
Grand 
Total
Grand 
Total
Gra
nd 
Tot
al
Grand 
Total
Grand 
Total
valium pills
packs of cigarettes
cocaine addicts
cocaine addicts
Years of regular use
Total units of that drug purchased in 
simulation
Heroin 0.843**
Cocaine 0.434**
Marijuana 0.505**
Alcohol 0.614**
Valium 0.402**
Breath or urine result positive
Total units of that drug purchased in 
simulation
Heroin 0.483**
Cocaine 0.111
Marijuana 0.331**
Alcohol 0.199*
* Indicates a p-value of 0.08.
** Indicates a p-value smaller than 0.01.
Table 3: Correlations between the experimental 
choices and real-life drug use
Dependent var:
# obs :
Heroin price -0.081 ** 0.035 *** -0.047 -0.035 *** -0.034 * -0.032 ***
(0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Cocaine price -0.070 *** -0.035 *** 0.030 ** 0.035 *** 0.003 0.032 ***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Real expenditure (C/P) -0.205 *** -0.129 ** 0.006 0.014 -0.044 -0.041
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Age -0.007 -0.007 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male -0.055 -0.072 -0.025 -0.027 0.032 0.032
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
White -0.083 -0.100 -0.046 -0.048 0.041 0.041
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Education years 0.031 * 0.034 * -0.011 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Employment problems 0.088 *** 0.087 *** -0.042 ** -0.042 ** -0.028 -0.028
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Health problems 0.204 0.193 -0.167 ** -0.168 ** -0.074 -0.074
(0.15) (0.16) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Constant 1.111 *** 0.614 ** 0.302 0.249 0.150 0.075
(0.35) (0.29) (0.28) (0.21) (0.13) (0.11)
F-Stat
*p value
Homogeneity test c2(1)
Hom Test Prob > c2(1)
Symmetry test c2(1)
Sym Test Prob > c2(1)
Standard errors reported in parentheses.
**Generalized Least Squares with heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors. 
Specification
Constrai
ned
Uncons
trained
0.002
12.790
0.000
11.43
0.000
Heroin (wh) Marijuana (wm)
Constrai
ned
328328328
Cocaine (wc)
Unconst
rained
328328
Unconstra
ined
328
Constrai
ned
9.690
4.090
0.000
0.190
0.665
12.790
0.000
11.860
0.000
4.330
0.000
1.730
0.188
4.470
0.000
7.500
0.000
GLS** GLS** GLS**
Table 4:  Regression Results for Addictive Substances 
Demand using the Almost Ideal Demand System (Heroin 
Addicts Only)
*p value: Probability that P>F(k-l,n)
Table 4:  Regression Results for Addictive Substances 
Demand using the Almost Ideal Demand System (Heroin 
Addicts Only)
Dependent var:
# obs :
Heroin price 0.137 *** 0.032 *** 0.007 -0.002
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Cocaine price 0.027 *** -0.032 *** 0.006 * 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Real expenditure (C/P) 0.224 *** 0.156 *** 0.005 -0.001
(0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Age -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male 0.096 *** 0.111 *** -0.017 ** -0.016
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
White 0.056 ** 0.072 *** 0.011 0.013
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Education years -0.014 -0.017 0.003*** 0.003 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Employment problems -0.028 *** -0.027 ** -0.002 -0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Health problems 0.012 0.022 0.013 0.014
(0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant -0.457 *** 0.053 -0.070 ** -0.029
(0.17) (0.09) (0.03) (0.02)
R-sq 64.82 45.97 6.07
*p value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Homogeneity test c2(1) 14.010 0.960
Hom Test Prob > c2(1) 0.000 0.328
Standard errors reported in parentheses.
**Generalized Least Squares with heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors. 
Specification
GLS**
Uncons
trained
Valium (wv)
328
Constr
328
Alcohol (wa)
Unconstr
ained
GLS**
*p value: Probability that P>F(k-l,n) 
6.03
0.000
328
Constr
328
Dependent var: Marijuana (wm)
# obs :
Heroin price -0.006 0.017 ** -0.024 *** -0.017 ** 0.002 0.047 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Cocaine price -0.069 *** -0.017 ** -0.117 *** 0.017 ** -0.059 *** -0.047 ***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Real expenditure (C/P) -0.101 *** -0.077 ** -0.141 * -0.075 -0.121 *** -0.116 ***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Age -0.006 -0.006 0.009 0.009 -0.002 -0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Male 0.045 0.042 -0.024 -0.032 0.023 0.023
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
White 0.029 0.029 -0.103 -0.103 0.045 0.045
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
Education years 0.024 0.024 -0.008 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Employment problems -0.051 -0.043 0.049 0.070 0.022 0.023
(0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14) (0.07) (0.07)
Health problems 0.075 *** 0.065 ** 0.028 0.002 -0.042 -0.043
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 0.305 0.082 0.945 ** 0.501 0.493 *** 0.342 *
(0.34) (0.32) (0.44) (0.38) (0.22) (0.17)
F-Stat 9.15 8.780 9.250 8.120 12.000 17.530
*p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Homogeneity test c2(1) 6.940 7.420 5.030
Hom Test Prob > c2(1) 0.008 0.006 0.025
Symmetry test c2(1) 8.960 8.960
Sym Test Prob > c2(1) 0.003 0.003
Standard errors reported in parentheses.
**Generalized Least Squares with heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors. 
Constrain
ed
320 320
Unconstr
ained
Constraine
d
320
GLS**
Cocaine (wc)
320
Unconstra
ined
Table 5:  Regression Results for Addictive Substances Demand 
using the Almost Ideal Demand System (Cocaine Addicts Only)
*p value: Probability that P>F(k-l,n) 
Heroin (wh)
Unconstra
ined
GLS**
320
Constraine
d
GLS**
Specification
320
Table 5:  Regression Results for Addictive Substances Demand 
using the Almost Ideal Demand System (Cocaine Addicts Only)
Dependent var:
# obs :
Heroin price 0.025 *** -0.025 * 0.001 0.000
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Cocaine price 0.174 *** 0.025 * -0.001 0.000
(0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Real expenditure (C/P) 0.269 *** 0.197 *** -0.002 -0.002
(0.08) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00)
Age 0.001 0.000 0.001 * 0.001 *
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male 0.039 0.048 -0.004 -0.004
(0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
White -0.006 -0.007 0.015 ** 0.015 **
(0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Education years -0.004 -0.003 0.000 0.000
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Employment problems -0.045 -0.067 0.011 0.011
(0.09) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01)
Health problems -0.051 -0.023 -0.004 -0.004
(0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant -0.697 *** -0.098 -0.033 -0.034
(0.21) (0.19) (0.03) (0.03)
R-sq 27.07 17.53 11.14 12.50
†p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Homogeneity test c2(1) 20.460 0.020
Hom Test Prob > c2(1) 0.000 0.898
Standard errors reported in parentheses.
**Generalized Least Squares with heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors. 
320
Unconstr
ained
Constraine
d
320
*p value: Probability that P>F(k-l,n) 
Alcohol (wa) Valium (wv)
Specification
GLS** GLS**
320
Unconstra
ined
320
Constrain
ed
Heroin Heroin
heroin -0.917 *** -0.818 *** heroin -0.913 *** -0.882 ***
0.003 0.003 0.008 0.010
cocaine 0.001  0.017 * cocaine -0.051 *** 0.057 ***
0.006 0.009 0.001 0.002
Cocaine Cocaine
heroin -0.182 *** -0.159 *** heroin 0.189 *** 0.084 ***
0.009 0.010 0.034 0.026
cocaine -0.902 *** -0.892 *** cocaine -1.051 *** -0.896 ***
0.006 0.008 0.003 0.004
Marijuana Marijuana
heroin -0.055 *** -0.048 *** heroin 0.100 *** 0.275 ***
0.009 0.012 0.022 0.037
cocaine 0.091 *** 0.224 *** cocaine 0.052 *** 0.090 ***
0.010 0.014 0.005 0.008
Alcohol Alcohol
heroin -0.289 *** -0.792 *** heroin -1.586 *** -1.754 ***
0.013 0.026 0.142 0.151
cocaine -0.384 *** -0.635 *** cocaine -0.057 *** -0.941 ***
0.018 0.030 0.014 0.024
Valium Valium
heroin 0.067 *** -0.034 *** heroin 0.015 *** 0.013 *
0.007 0.008 0.006 0.007
cocaine 0.090 *** 0.042 * cocaine 0.006 ** 0.011  
0.015 0.026 0.003 0.008
Cigarettes Cigarettes
heroin 0.242 ** 0.012 * heroin -0.806  -0.916  
0.119 0.007 0.575 0.609
cocaine -0.025  -0.274 *** cocaine 0.071  -0.347  
0.021 0.010 0.212 0.295
*, ** and *** indicate 90%, 95% and 99% level of significance, respectively. 
The budget share wj is the individual's average budget share for product j  and the coefficients' variances and covariances are the estimated 
ones.
for the own price elasticities
for the cross price elasticities
The variances of the elasticities are calculated according to the formulae:                                                                                                                     
Demand
Price
Constrained
Heroin Addicts Sample: Cocaine Addicts Sample:
†
 Seemingly Unrelated Equations with standard errors corrected for heterocedasticity
SUR† 
Unconstrained Constrained
SUR† SUR† 
Table 6: Cross and Own Price Elasticities Using  the Almost Ideal Demand System
SUR† 
Demand
Price
Unconstrained
iiiiiiiiii wwVarVarVar /),cov(2/)()()( 2  
)],cov(2)()([/1)( 22 ijijijijiij wVarVarwwVar  

Figure 1: Effects of heroin price
changes on heroin purchases
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Figure 2: Effects of heroin price changes on other drugs’ purchases in heroin
(top) and cocaine (bottom) addicts
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Figure 3: Effect of cocaine price changes on cocaine
purchases
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Figure 4: Effects of cocaine price changes on other drugs’ purchases
in heroin (top) and cocaine (bottom) addicts
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